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Identical letters dated 20 February 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my country, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of an initiative of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, Leader of the Revolution of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, towards the resolution of the Korean crisis.

(*Signed*) Ahmed **Own**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Resolution of the Korean question

The Korean question has once again become a source of anxiety and perhaps a source of danger in the international political sphere. It is a sensitive question owing to complications going back to the Second World War and even earlier, especially to the time when, at the end of the War, Korea was divided into two States, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), under the control of the Soviet Union, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), under the control of the United States of America. Each of the great powers came to have its own vassal government. This is exactly what happened to Germany under the same conditions when the East German State, known as the German Democratic Republic, was established and came under Soviet control, while the West German State, or Federal Republic of Germany, came under American control. The Government of each part became a vassal to the great power that had occupied it.

My reasons for saying that the Korean question is extremely sensitive are as follows:

1. The Korean peninsula was coveted by its big neighbours, and any dramatic stirring might reawaken those designs. Korea had been under Chinese occupation since a century before the birth of Christ. It was the object of a Japanese invasion in the sixteenth century and was occupied by Japan, becoming a Japanese protectorate, from the beginning of the twentieth century to the end of the Second World War. America and Europe, moreover, have not been far away from this arena since those times;

2. The neighbours of the Korean peninsula harbour enmity towards each other;

3. Faraway States in America and Europe are not oblivious to what Korea's neighbours are doing;

4. North Korea is still communist, and this annoys the capitalist countries;

5. North Korea is to a certain extent an ally of China, the nuclear yellow giant, something to be taken fully into account when relations with North Korea heat up;

6. North Korea is considered a nuclear power; in any event it is the manufacturer and not the importer of ballistic missiles whose range would allow them to reach Japan and America;

7. North Korea has one of the biggest armies in Asia (1 million infantry and 4.5 million reservists);

8. These facts make North Korea a by no means negligible threat to the allies of the United States of America, such as South Korea and Japan, and to the United States armies that have been stationed in those countries since the Second World War;

9. Any danger to which South Korea is exposed means that 40,000 United States soldiers are exposed to the same danger, whether from North Korea or from its allies;

10. Any danger to which Japan is exposed signifies that the American armies there are exposed to the same danger;

11. The reunification of Germany and the fall of the Berlin wall was a provocation to the Koreans, for why should the two Germanies be reunited and not the two Koreas? Why should the Berlin wall be removed and not the American minefield between the two Koreas, which is the biggest minefield in the world today?

12. The reunification of the two Koreas has implications for the reunification of the two Chinas (Taiwan and mainland China);

13. Any attempt to unite the two Koreas by force will meet with failure. Indeed, when Kim Il Sung decided to reunite them in the early 1950s, when internal conditions were conducive, the following happened:

(a) The reunification process met with armed external opposition by 19 States, headed by the United States of America;

(b) It was met with a Security Council resolution against reunification by force;

(c) United States President Truman issued an order to his forces in Japan to move to prevent the reunification of Korea by force;

(d) The Chinese participated intensively in the struggle;

(e) A limited world (regional) war broke out despite the mutual occupation of the two capitals, yet reunification was not achieved by force.

The only result was the downing of a thousand aircraft, the destruction of railways, electric power stations and factories, and 4 million casualties.

Therefore no attempt to reunite Korea by force, provocation and terrorism will succeed. This is an established fact and a lesson derived from history, and one would be a fool to ignore it.

Most dangerous would be any adventures leading to a clash of 2 million active Korean soldiers and nearly 9 million reservists with forces of the major nuclear powers that are in the region and the allies of both.

Peaceful reunification

Fundamental factors of reunification

1. North and South Korea are both made up of a single Mongolian race;

2. The uniform religion has been Buddhist, Confucian and local Korean since the fourth century;

3. The culture has had the same Buddhist, Confucian and local religious sources and influencing factors, together with a Chinese and Japanese influence;

4. Korea was a single country since the seventh century;

5. Material factors that would encourage unity include the following:

(a) The population growth rate is the same in both halves, in the range of approximately 1 per cent;

(b) The administrative system is the same: provinces and cities;

(c) The average age is approximately the same;

(d) The urbanization rate is also similar, from 60 to 80 per cent;

(e) Education is compulsory and free up to the age of approximately 12 years in both parts;

(f) The industrial strength of united Korea will be approximately 170 million tons of iron, steel, crude oil and other minerals, which means that united Korea would rank ninth or at least tenth among the world's countries in terms of trade;

(g) The labour force will amount to 36 million;

(h) Energy integration will be achieved, inasmuch as 40 per cent of the energy in the South is nuclear, while 66 per cent in the North is hydroelectric, whereas 2 per cent is hydroelectric in the South and there is a single nuclear power plant in the North;

(i) The peacefully unified State will have from 8 to 10 important ports, whereas each half individually has only approximately four ports;

(j) Peacefully unified Korea will possess nearly 100,000 kilometres of roads and railways, and nearly 2,000 kilometres of waterways exist in the North;

(k) Peacefully unified Korea will have nearly 1,000 institutes of higher learning;

(l) A savings of 40 per cent of the budget currently allocated to spending on military strength, owing to the confrontation between the two halves, will be realized;

(m) North Korea under Kim Jong Il is more open and more flexible. All the reunification conferences sponsored or recommended by others failed, as did all the reunification wars in which others took part. No meeting between the leaders of the two sides had taken place for 55 years, until 2000, when the following was declared:

The South and the North have agreed to solve the problem of reunification independently, through the united efforts of the Korean nation, the master of the country;

This is the right direction, a direction in which the lessons of the past appear to have been taken into account. It deserves to be encouraged internationally by all lovers of peace among peoples and of loyalty. Officials in South Korea are more forbearing towards their brothers and sisters in the North, as shown by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's going to Pyongyang and South Korean aid to North Korea in times of disaster and need.

Consequently any attempt to achieve unification from without or within by force or threat of force or terrorism is doomed to fail and must be absolutely ruled out.

What is needed is an in-depth examination on the part of the Koreans themselves in both halves of Korea so as to evaluate the losses resulting from

separation and the oppressiveness of confrontation and enmity, on the one hand, and all the material and psychological benefits of unity between the two halves, on the other. The friends in the North must curb or refrain from any repetition of certain provocative forms of behaviour and breaks in relations, sometimes for transitory reasons.

The two halves must be reunited so as to ensure an end to the nuclear programme in the North in return for the withdrawal of the United States army in the South, for with unity the North will no longer need nuclear weapons and the South will no longer need the American army.